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From Griggs to Wards Cove: The Blurring of
Disparate Impact and Disparate Treatment Under
Title VII of the 1964 Civil Rights Act
INTRODUCTION
On June 5, 1989, the Supreme Court, in a 5-4 opinion, decided
Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Atonio,l which delineated the eviden-
tiary burdens now applicable in Title VII disparate impact cases.
The Court placed on employment discrimination plaintiffs a num-
ber of evidentiary burdens which they previously have not had to
bear. Specifically, plaintiffs must now demonstrate the particular
employment practice or practices creating the disparate impact;2
moreover, the Court held that the burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff at all times.3 The holdings in Wards Cove repre-
sented clear departures from prior law, as disparate treatment
burdens were applied to disparate impact cases.
Media and legal commentators4 expressed the opinion that
Wards Cove effectively overruled the landmark disparate impact
case of Griggs v. Duke Power Co.' The majority opinion by Jus-
tice White6 in Wards Cove drew a sharp dissent from Justice Ste-
vens7 which accused the majority of unfairly tipping the scales in
favor of employers. In his dissent, Justice Blackmun wondered
whether a majority of Supreme Court justices actually believed
employment discrimination is still a problem in this country.'
The Wards Cove decision prompted Ohio Senator Howard Met-
zenbaum to introduce a bill in Congress9 which would explicitly
overrule Wards Cove. On January 23, 1990, Senator Metzenbaumjoined Senator Kennedy in introducing the Civil Rights Act of
1990.1° This Act incorporates the provisions for Senator Metzen-
1. - U.S. -, 109 S. Ct. 2115 (1989).
2. Id. at 2124.
3. Id. at 2131.
4. New York Times, July 7, 1989, at A12, col. 3; Schwartz, Disparate Impact
Cases: Griggs to Wards Cove, N.Y. L.J., Sept. 19, 1989, at 3, col. 3.
5. 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
6. Justice White was joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor,
Scalia and Kennedy.
7. Justice Stevens, joined by Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun wrote the
first of two dissenting opinions. The other was written by Justice Blackmun, joined by
Justices Brennan and Marshall.
8. 109 S. Ct. at 2136 (J. Blackmun dissenting).
9. S. 1261, 101st Congress, June 23, 1989.
10. S. 2104, 101st Congress, 2d Session, February 7, (legislative day, January 23),
1
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baum's Fair Employment Reinstatement Act and would create a
subsection (k) of Title VII: "Proof of Unlawful Employment Prac-
tices in Disparate Impact Cases."
This Note traces the history of judicial interpretations of Title
VII, focusing on the Court's development of the disparate impact
theory. It demonstrates that while the decision in Wards Cove is
ostensibly in direct opposition to Griggs, a careful analysis of the
disparate impact and disparate treatment cases handed down by
the Supreme Court in the eighteen years since Griggs reveals an
identifiable progression towards the result in Wards Cove. It ana-
lyzes the two circuit court cases decided in the wake of Wards
Cove. Further, it critiques the proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990
and explains that, while statutory reform may be the best ap-
proach to bring Title VII back in line with the intent of Congress,
Senator Metzenbaum made some serious errors in drafting his
contribution which could cause the Civil Rights Act of 1990 to be
defeated.
I. BACKGROUND
The Civil Rights Act of 1964 was enacted in response to eco-
nomic boycotts, mass marches and other forms of protest on the
part of black Americans who demanded equality in voting, hous-
ing, education and employment." Title VII was specifically in-
tended to eliminate workplace discrimination based on race, color,
religion, sex or national origin. 2
Courts have developed two distinct theories of liability or causes
of action under Title VII. The first, disparate treatment, addresses
situations where the employer has intentionally discriminated
against the employee. The other, disparate impact, involves em-
ployment practices which are discriminatory in effect even though
the employer has no discriminatory intent.'3 Although the funda-
1990.
II. Comment, Defining the Proper Bounds of Disparate Impact Analysis: Beyond an
Objective/Subjective Employment Criteria Dichotomy, 49 U. PT. L. REv. 658, 663
(1988).
12. Section 2000e-2(a) of the Act provides:
It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-
(I) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such in-
dividual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for employment in
any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of
such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
13. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters v. United States, 431 U.S. 324, 335-36, n.15 (1977),
where the Court distinguishes between disparate treatment and disparate impact as
follows:
[Vol. 26
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mental distinction between disparate treatment and disparate im-
pact is clear, the courts have had difficulty in maintaining this
distinction when applying these two theories to particular factual
situations. After setting out the evidentiary burdens delineated in
the seminal cases, this Note reviews in chronological order the Su-
preme Court cases applying these two theories. This will demon-
strate that the distinction between the two theories was blurred
well before the recent companion cases of Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust 4 and Wards Cove, which will be treated
together.
II. EVIDENTIARY BURDENS UNDER DISPARATE TREATMENT
AND DISPARATE IMPACT
A. Disparate Treatment
In McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green,'5 the Court outlined the
order and allocation of proof in a disparate treatment case. Ac-
cording to the Court, the plaintiff initially has the burden of es-
tablishing a prima facie case of discrimination. The plaintiff must
show:
(i) that he belongs to a racial minority;(ii) that he applied and was qualified for a job for which the
employer was seeking applicants;(iii) that despite his qualifications, he was rejected;
(iv) that, after his rejection, the position remained open and the
employer continued to seek applicants from persons of complain-
ant's qualifications."6
Green, the black plaintiff in McDonnell Douglas, successfully es-
tablished a prima facie case by showing that he applied and was
qualified for rehire as a mechanic, that he was rejected, and that
the employer continued to seek applications from persons with his
qualifications.17
"Disparate treatment" such as is alleged in the present case is the most easily
understood type of discrimination. The employer simply treats some people less
favorably than others because of their race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Proof of discriminatory motive is critical, although it can in some situations be
inferred from the mere fact of differences in treatment... ["Disparate impact"
claims] involve employment practices that are facially neutral in their treatment
of different groups but that in fact fall more harshly on one group than another
and cannot be justified by business necessity. Proof of discriminatory motive, we
have held, is not required under a disparate impact theory.
(Citation omitted).
14. 487 U.S. 977, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
15. 411 U.S. 792 (1973). Justice Powell delivered the opinion for a unanimous
Court.
16. Id. at 802. This prima facie case, while flexible, applies only to failure to hire
cases. Other elements must be proven in wrongful termination cases.
17. Id. at 804.
1990]
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In McDonnell Douglas, the Court further held that in order to
rebut plaintiff's prima facie case, the employer must articulate
"some legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's re-
jection."18 In this case, the employer cited Green's unlawful civil
rights protest activity against it as the reason for rejecting his ap-
plication. 19 The Court accepted this reason as legitimate and non-
discriminatory, and thus concluded that the employer had success-
fully rebutted Green's prima facie case.2" The Court, however,
remanded the case to afford Green a fair opportunity to show that
the employer's stated nondiscriminatory reason for his rejection
was merely a pretext for discrimination.2
In sum, McDonnell Douglas established that the allocation and
burdens of proof in a Title VII disparate treatment case consist of
three distinct stages:
(1) the plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of
discrimination;
(2) the defendant must articulate a legitimate, non-discrimina-
tory reason for its rejection of the plaintiff; and
(3) the plaintiff must establish that this supposedly legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason was a pretext to mask an illegal
motive.22
Notice that the burden which shifts to the defendant is merely one
of articulating a non-discriminatory reason, or burden of produc-
tion. The burden of persuasion remains with the plaintiff at all
times.23
B. Disparate Impact
The disparate impact cause of action is reserved for cases in-
volving facially-neutral employment practices which more harshly
affect a protected group and cannot be justified by business neces-
sity. Proof of discriminatory intent is not a requirement.24 The
18. Id.
19. Green's protests included organizing a traffic stall-in to obstruct the main en-
trance to the plant during the morning rush hour. Green was also implicated in a lock-in,
whereby the building was chained and padlocked to prevent workers from leaving. Id. at
794-95.
20. Id. at 804.
21. Id.
22. SCHLEI & GROSSMAN, EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LAW 14 (2d ed. 1983).
23. The burden of production is sometimes called the burden of evidence or the duty
of going forward. CLEARY, MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE 947 n.2 (3d ed. 1984). If the bur-
den is not met, the judge is empowered to issue a directed verdict.
The burden of persuasion only comes into play if both parties have sustained their bur-
den of producing evidence. Id. at 947. In civil cases, the burden of persuasion means proof
by a preponderance of the evidence. Id. at 956.
24. See Int'l Bhd. of Teamsters, supra note 13.
[Vol. 26
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seminal disparate impact case, Griggs v. Duke Power Co.,25 illus-
trates this concept.2"
The day Title VII went into effect 2 7 Duke Power Company in-
stituted a requirement that employees who wished to be promoted
must attain satisfactory scores on two standardized aptitude tests
and possess a high school diploma.' Neither requirement mea-
sured nor was intended to measure the capability of employees to
perform a particular job or category of jobs at the plant."
Although the Court held that the defendant power plant did not
have any discriminatory intent, the requirements were still found
to have an adverse effect on blacks. A 1960 North Carolina cen-
sus showed that 34% of white males had completed high school,
while only 12% of black males had high school diplomas.30 Since
the employment requirements instituted by the employer created
an adverse impact upon blacks, the Court found the employer in
violation of Title VII, despite a lack of discriminatory intent. 1
The problem remaining after Griggs is that the Court failed to
clearly state the evidentiary burdens of the new disparate impact
theory of liability. Specifically, the Court stated:
The Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also prac-
tices that are fair in form, but discriminatory in operation. The
touchstone is business necessity. If an employment practice
which operates to exclude Negroes cannot be shown to be re-
lated to job performance, the practice is prohibited. . . . Con-
gress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any
given requirement must have a manifest relationship to the em-
ployment in question. 32
The only element of a prima facie case for disparate impact which
is given in Griggs is that the plaintiff has the burden of asserting
25. 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Chief Justice Burger delivered the opinion of the Court in
which all members joined except Justice Brennan, who took no part in the consideration or
decision of the case.
26. Griggs was the second substantive decision of the Court under Title VII. The
first, Phillips v. Martin Marrieta Corp, 400 U.S. 542 (1971), held that Title VII prohibited
discrimination in hiring against mothers with preschool age children. Rose, Subjective Em-
ployment Practices: Does the Discriminatory Impact Analysis Apply? 25 SAN DIEGO L.
REv. 63, 64 (1988).
27. Title VII was effective July 2, 1965; see 401 U.S. 424, at 426.
28. 401 U.S. at 427-28. The two tests were the Wonderlic Personnel Test, which
measures general intelligence, and the Bennett Mechanical Comprehension Test.
29. Id. at 428.
30. Id. at 430, n.6. Similarly, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(EEOC) found that the use of standardized tests, including those used by the defendant in
Griggs, resulted in 58% of whites passing the tests, while only 6% of blacks received pass-
ing scores. Id. at 431.
31. The court of appeals held that the Company had adopted the diploma and test
requirements without any "intention to discriminate against Negro employees." 420 F.2d
at 1232.
32. 401 U.S. at 431-32.
1990]
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that a facially-neutral standard or test in practice selected appli-
cants in a discriminatory pattern. The employer must counter by
showing that the standard was job related. By "burden of show-
ing" does the Court mean burden of persuasion or burden of pro..
duction? Is "manifest relationship" the same as "job relatedness"
or "business necessity" (which the Court stated is the "touch-
stone" of the Act)? By virtue of its vagueness, the elements of a
disparate impact case have been subjected to numerous interpreta..
tions, reflecting the will of the majority of the Court.3
III. DISPARATE IMPACT CASES AFTER GRIGGS
It fell on the first disparate impact case decided by the Court
after Griggs to clarify the allocation and burdens of proof under
this new theory of liability. This occurred in Albemarle Paper Co.
v. Moody.34 By relying on both Griggs (the primary disparate im-
pact case) and McDonnell Douglas (the primary disparate treat-
ment case), the Court, however, foreshadowed the impending con-
fusion between these two causes of action.3 5
Prior to 1964, the defendant paper plant in Albemarle strictly
segregated its lines of promotion, precluding blacks from the
higher-paying positions.36 The paper plant discontinued its overt
segregation in 1964, but allowed blacks to transfer to the skilled
lines only if they could pass two standardized tests.37 The Court
noted that only a "few" blacks successfully passed the tests.3,
The Court began its discussion of the testing issue by citing its
holding in Griggs: "This Court unanimously held [in Griggs] that
Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discrimina-
tory in effect unless the employer meets 'the burden of showing
33. Proper allocation of the burdens is critical since "to allocate the burden of pro-
duction and persuasion is, in many instances, to decide the case." Smith, Employer De-
fenses in Employment Discrimination Litigation: A Reassessment of Burden of Proof and
Substantive Standards Following Texas Dept. of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 55 Ehf-
PLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION LITIGATION 372, 373 (1982).
34. 422 U.S. 405 (1975). Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court, in
which Justices Douglas, Brennan, White, Marshall and Rehnquist joined. Justice Black-
mun filed an opinion concurring in the judgment. Chief Justice Burger concurred in part
and dissented in part. Justice Powell took no part in the consideration or decision of the
case.
35. Since McDonnell Douglas was the only case since Griggs to address the shifting
burdens of proof in Title VII cases, the reference to McDonnell Douglas in Albemarle did
not signal the merger of two theories. It was only in retrospect that it appeared that the
reference to McDonnell Douglas in a disparate impact case might alter the magnitude of
the employer's burden. See Note, Business Necessity: Judicial Dualism and the Search for
Adequate Standards, 15 GA. L. REv. 376, 409-10 (1981).
36. 422 U.S. at 401.
37. Id. at 428-29. As in Griggs, the employer required employees seeking promotion
to pass the Beta and Wonderlic Tests.
38. Id. at 429.
[Vol. 26
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that any given requirement [has]... a manifest relationship to the
employment in question.' ,a The Court then proceeded to cite
McDonnell Douglas, a disparate treatment case, to explain that
this burden arises only after the plaintiff has made out a prima
facie case of discrimination, "i.e. has shown that the tests in ques-
tion select applicants for hire or promotion in a racial pattern sig-
nificantly different from that of the pool of applicants."40 The Al-
bemarle Court then contradicted itself and stated that if the
employer "meets the burden of proving that its tests are 'job re-
lated,'" the burden is then on the employee to show that other
tests without an undesirable racial effect would serve the em-
ployer's purpose.4
In sum, the Court in Albemarle outlined the order and alloca-
tion of proof for a disparate impact case as follows:
(1) The plaintiff must establish a prima facie case of discrimina-
tion by showing that the tests in question select applicants for
hire or promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from
that of the pool of applicants;(2) The employer then has the burden of proving that its tests
are job related;(3) It then remains open to the plaintiff to show that other tests
or selection devices would serve the employer's legitimate inter-
est without an undesirable racial effect. 2
Notice the tripartite order of proof, similar to the disparate treat-
ment structure. Note also the addition of the third prong, requir-
ing the plaintiff to show suitable alternatives to the employer's
practice, which is conspicuously absent in Griggs.
To summarize, it would appear that after Albemarle, the major
distinction between disparate treatment and disparate impact is
the standard of proof necessary for the employer to rebut the
plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination. In a disparate treat-
ment case, the employer may rebut by merely producing a legiti-
mate, non-discriminatory reason for the plaintiff's rejection,
whereas in a disparate impact case, the employer has the burden
of proving that its tests are job related.
The next disparate impact case, Dothard v. Rawlinson,43 was
handed down by an extremely splintered Court.44 Rawlinson, the
39. Id. at 425, quoting Griggs at 432. The Court in this passage in Griggs was con-
struing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) relating to testing.
40. Id. at 425, citing McDonnell Douglas, at 802.
41. Id. at 425, citing McDonnell Douglas, at 801 (emphasis added).
42. Id. at 425.
43. 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
44. Justice Stewart delivered the opinion of the Court in which Justices Powell and
Stevens joined. Chief Justice Burger and Justices Blackmun and Rehnquist joined in all
but Part 11; Justices Brennan and Marshall joined in all but Part 111. Justice Rehnquist
1990]
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female plaintiff, was denied employment as a prison guard in Ala-
bama's state men's prison for failing to meet a minimum weight
requirement.45 She demonstrated that the height and weight pa-
rameters, when taken together, excluded 41.13 % of women in the
United States between the ages of 18 and 79, while excluding less
than 1 % of the men.46 She further contended that these figures
constituted a disparate impact on women in violation of Title VII.
The Supreme Court agreed with the district court's finding that
the height and weight standards had a discriminatory impact on
women. It went on to hold that the employer 47 failed to rebut
Rawlinson's prima facie case because it failed to sufficiently corre-
late height and weight to the physical strength which it main-
tained was essential to job performance as a prison guard.46 De-
spite this, the employer escaped liability by showing that the
requirement constituted a bona fide occupational qualification and
was permitted due to its necessity for the normal operation of the
business or enterprise.4 9
Since the majority failed to refine the evidentiary burdens in
disparate impact cases, we must look to the concurring opinion of
Justice Rehnquist "° in order to "take the pulse" of the Court in
1977 as to the relative burdens of proof. Citing McDonnell Doug-
las, Griggs, and Albemarle, Rehnquist stated:
Appellants, in order to rebut the prima facie case under the stat-
ute, had the burden placed on them to advance job-related rea-
sons for the qualification . . . [O]nce the burden has been
placed on the defendant, it is then up to the defendant to articu-
late the asserted job-related reasons underlying the use of the
minima. 1
"Articulate" is the word used by Justice Powell in McDonnell
Douglas, a disparate treatment case, to signify the defendant's
burden of production. Therefore, we are apparently being told, al-
beit by a minority of the Court, that the employer's rebuttal bur-
filed an opinion concurring in the result and concurring in part, in which Chief Justice
Burger and Justice Blackmun joined. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in part
and dissenting in part, in which Justice Brennan joined. Justice White filed a dissenting
opinion.
45. While meeting the minimum height requirement of 5 feet 2 inches, Rawlinson
did not meet the minimum 120 pound requirement established by Alabama statute. 433
U.S. 321, at 323-24.
46. Id. at 329-30.
47. Dothard, the employer, was the Director of the Alabama Department of Public
Safety.
48. 433 U.S. 321, at 331.
49. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) permits sex-based discrimination if, as in this case, it is
reasonably necessary for the normal operation of the business or enterprise. Id. at 334.
50. Chief Justice Burger and Justice Blackmun joined in the concurrence.
51. Id. at 339, citing McDonnell Douglas, at 802, Griggs, at 431 and Albemarle, at
[Vol. 26
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den in disparate impact cases is also one of production, not per-
suasion. It is not surprising, therefore, to find Justice Rehnquist
still advocating this lesser burden for employers in Wards Cove.
The next disparate impact case, New York City Transit Au-
thority v. Beazer,52 is important for several reasons. The Court
held that the plaintiffs failed to prove a violation of Title VII,
agreeing with the district court's express finding that the Transit
Authority's rule against hiring persons in methadone-treatment
programs "was not motivated by racial animus. ' ' 53 This finding
"foreclose[d] any claim in rebuttal that it was merely a pretext
for intentional discrimination." 5 It is significant because the moti-
vation of the employer in a disparate impact case had always been
thought irrelevant, and this analysis indicates confusion as to the
distinctions between the two theories of liability. The case is also
important for the glimpse into Justice White's thoughts on dispa-
rate impact, since his views seem to change dramatically in the
majority opinion he authored in Wards Cove.
The plaintiffs in Beazer were two former employees of the
Transit Authority (TA) and two potential employees, all four of
whom had been involved in a methadone program for the treat-
ment of heroin addiction. They alleged that TA's blanket exclu-
sion from employment of former heroin addicts receiving metha-
done treatment was violative of Title VII and the Equal
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.55
The district court found that TA's policy was unconstitutional
because it lacked a rational relation to the business needs of TA,56
and that it violated Title VII because it had a disparate impact on
minorities. The district court based its finding of disparate impact
on the following facts: (1) 81 % of employees referred to TA's
medical consultant for suspicion of drug use were black or His-
panic; and (2) between 62 and 65 % of all people in methadone-
treatment programs in New York are black or Hispanic. 57 The
district court did not find the policy to be racially motivated; in
fact, it expressly found the policy to have been adopted without a
discriminatory intent.55
The court of appeals affirmed the district court's constitutional
52. 440 U.S. 568 (1979). Justice Stevens delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, Blackmun and Rehnquist. Justice Powell
filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part. Justice Brennan filed a dissenting
statement and Justice White filed a dissenting opinion joined by Justice Marshall.
53. Id. at 587, citing 414 F. Supp. at 279.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 577.
56. Id. at 579.
57. 414 F. Supp. 277, 278-79 (SDNY 1976).
58. Id. at 279.
1990]
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holding, 59 whi!e declining to reach the statutory issue. It has long
been established, however, that constitutional grounds are not to
be addressed if statutory grounds for a decision are available.60
Therefore, the Supreme Court first addressed the issue of Title
VII liability.
The Supreme Court disagreed with the district court that the
two statistics noted above constituted a violation of Title VII.6'
Relying on Griggs and Albemarle, the Court found that even if
the statistical evidence was capable of establishing a prima facie
case, it was rebutted by TA's showing that the narcotics rule was
job related.62 Furthermore, the district court's finding of no racial
animus was held to foreclose a claim in rebuttal that the rule was
a pretext for intentional discrimination. 3 Therefore, no violation
of Title VII was found. This introduction of pretext and intent,
hallmarks of disparate treatment analysis, indicates that the meld-
ing of disparate impact into disparate treatment was well under-
way at this juncture.
Beazer is also noteworthy because it demonstrates the dramatic
shift in Justice White's thinking in the ten-year span between this
case and Wards Cove. Unlike the Beazer majority, White thought
it "insufficient that the rule as a whole has some relationship to
employment so long as a readily identifiable and severable part of
it does not."' 4 Relying on Griggs, White said that "[p]etitioners
had the burden of showing job relatedness. . . .By petitioner's
own stipulation, this employment barrier was adopted 'without
meaningful study of [its] relationship to job-performance abil-
ity.' "165 This is a far cry from Justice White's language in Wards
Cove. There he stated that if a plaintiff makes out a prima facie
case of disparate impact, "the case will shift to any business justi-
fication petitioners offer for their use of these practices." 6
Connecticut v. Teal67 is another example of the Court wrestling
with the distinction between disparate impact and disparate treat-
ment. The majority held that the "bottom line" statistics neither
preclude employees from establishing a prima facie case nor pro-
59. 558 F.2d 97.
60. 440 U.S. at 582, citing Spector Motor Service, Inc. v. McLaughlin, 323 U.S.
101, 105 (1944).
61. 440 U.S. at 584.
62. Id. at 587.
63. Id.
64. Id. at 602.
65. Id., quoting Griggs at 431.
66. 109 S. Ct. at 2125.
67. 457 U.S. 440 (1982). Justice Brennan delivered the opinion of the Court, joined
by Justices White, Marshall, Blackmun and Stevens. Justice Powell wrote for the dissent,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Rehnquist and O'Connor.
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vide employers with a defense in disparate impact cases."8 Justice
Powell, writing for the dissent, stated that the focus in a disparate
impact case must be on the protected group, while only disparate
treatment cases may focus on an individual's treatment.69
On the basis of a written test, which was the first step in being
upgraded from provisional to permanent status as a Welfare Eligi-
bility Supervisor, 54.17% of the black candidates passed, com-
pared to 79.54% of the whites.70 The four respondents in this case
were among the blacks who failed the examination. One month
before trial, however, petitioners promoted 11 blacks and 35
whites to supervisory positions. Of the 48 black candidates who
applied for promotion, 22.9 % were elevated to supervisor, while
only 13.5 % of the 259 white candidates were promoted. 1
The district court treated respondents' claim as one of disparate
impact and, since the "bottom-line" result was more favorable to
blacks than whites, entered judgment for petitioners. Because the
"bottom-line" percentages were not indicative of a Title VII viola-
tion, the employer was not required to demonstrate the job-relat-
edness of the promotional examination 2.7 The court of appeals re-
versed, stating that "where an identifiable pass-fail barrier denies
an employment opportunity to a disproportionately large number
of minorities and prevents them from proceeding to the next step
in the selection process, that barrier must be shown to be job
related. 7 3
Relying on Griggs, Albemarle and Dothard, the Supreme Court
concluded that the focus in a disparate impact claim should be on
employment and promotion requirements that create a discrimina-
tory bar to opportunities, not on the actual number of minorities
ultimately hired or promoted.7 4 In other words, the racial compo-
sition of the "bottom-line" is no defense to the plaintiff's prima
facie case.7 5
Justice Powell's dissent was premised on the notion that "while
disparate treatment cases focus on the way in which an individual
has been treated, disparate impact cases are concerned with the
protected group."' 76 In disparate treatment cases, the focus is on a
person who is attempting to prove intentional individualized dis-
68. Id. at 442.
69. Id. at 457.
70. Id. at 443.
71. Id. at 444.
72. Id. at 445.
73. Id.
74. Id. at 957.
75. Id. at 452.
76. Id. at 452 (emphasis in original).
1990]
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crimination. In disparate impact cases, the burden of proof is car-
ried by showing that the employer's selection process rejects a dis-
proportionate number of persons from a protected group and, by
inference, the plaintiff himself was a victim of the process' "built-
in headwinds." 77
The majority countered this argument by suggesting that those
who believe the "bottom-line" is a defense to a claim of discrimi-
nation may be confusing unlawful discrimination with discrimina-
tory intent.78 Proof that a work force is racially balanced is rele-
vant when intent is an issue to be decided. But under Title VII,
"[a] racially balanced work force cannot immunize an employer
from liability for specific acts of discrimination. ' 79 It is again
noteworthy that Justice White, who joined the majority in Teal,
turned the racially-balanced work force argument on its head in
Wards Cove to cut against employees.8"
IV. DISPARATE TREATMENT CASES AFTER MCDONNELL
DOUGLAS
This Note will now analyze the two most significant disparate
treatment cases decided after McDonnell Douglas in order to doc-
ument the judicial application of this theory of liability.
Even though McDonnell Douglas appeared to do a better job
than Griggs of setting forth the respective burdens and allocation
of proof, Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters8' demonstrates
that the Court was still confused about the parties' respective evi-
dentiary burdens in disparate treatment cases.
Plaintiffs were three black bricklayers who sought employment
with Furnco by submitting applications at a job site. Highly quali-
fied bricklayers were required, and Furnco's policy was to hire
only workers known to management. Since Furnco had a self-im-
posed affirmative action plan and had hired several bricklayers
who had previously filed a discrimination suit against Furnco, the
district court concluded that plaintiffs failed to state a disparate
impact claim."2 The district court also held that since Furnco's
hiring practices were justified as a business necessity, plaintiffs
77. Id. at 459, quoting Griggs at 432.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 454, citing Furnco Construction Corp. v. Waters, 438 U.S. 567, 579(1978).
80. See infra note 114 and accompanying text.
81. 438 U.S. 567 (1978). Justice Rehnquist delivered the opinion of the Court,
joined by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart, White, Blackmun, Powell and Ste-
vens. Justice Marshall filed an opinion concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by
Justice Brennan.
82. Id. at 572.
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failed to state a case of disparate treatment as well.8"
This reference to business necessity in a disparate treatment re-
buttal indicates a confusion as to the proper burden to be borne by
the employer. Business necessity is the stricter rebuttal burden of
disparate impact, as contrasted with the requirement that the em-
ployer simply articulate a reason for its rejection of the plaintiff.
The court of appeals reversed the district court, holding that
plaintiffs had made out a prima facie case of disparate treat-
ment. 4 The reason the court of appeals gave, for not finding a
successful rebuttal to the prima facie case, however, was that the
employer had failed to utilize the hiring method calculated to give
consideration to the largest number of minority applicants.85
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in order to determine
whether the court of appeals "had gone too far in substituting its
own judgment as to proper hiring practices." '86 In its effort to clar-
ify the burden of proof in a disparate treatment case, the Court
confused the issue by first stating that the burden which shifts to
the employer in a disparate treatment case is that of "proving that
he based his employment decision on a legitimate consideration,
and not an illegitimate one such as race."81 Proving a legitimate
consideration is the standard reserved for disparate impact cases.
Three sentences later, the Court quoted McDonnell Douglas and
told us that the employer need only "articulate some legitimate,
nondiscriminatory reason for the employee's rejection."88 This re-
flects the burden of production usually associated with disparate
treatment cases. The end result-the Court's decision to reverse
the judgment of the court of appeals and "remand for further pro-
ceedings consistent with this opinion" -is slightly ironic. Consis-
tent with what?
Texas Department of Community Affairs v. Burdine"° is impor-
tant because it represents a unanimous decision by the Supreme
Court in which certiorari was granted for the express purpose of
resolving the defendant's evidentiary burdens in a disparate treat-
ment case. Burdine also makes clear that neither Furnco nor Title
VII requires an employer to restructure hiring policies to maxi-
mize the number of women and minorities hired or give preferen-
83. Id.
84. This was established because plaintiffs were members of a racial minority; they
applied for employment; even though qualified, they were not offered employment; the em-
ployer continued to seek applications from persons with similar qualifications. Id. at 576.
85. Id. at 576.
86. Id. at 574.
87. Id. at 577.
88. Id. at 578, quoting 411 U.S. 792, at 802.
89. Id. at 581.
90. 450 U.S. 248 (1981). Justice Powell delivered the opinion of a unanimous Court.
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tial treatment to members of the protected groups. 91 Burdine, a
woman, alleged that a male was promoted in her place to the posi-
tion of Project Director of the Public Serivice Careers Division of
the Texas Department of Community Affairs. She claimed she
was denied this promotion and subsequently terminated on the ba-
sis of gender in violation of Title VII. 92
While the district court held that neither decision was imper-
missibly based on sex, the court of appeals reversed. It maintained
that the defendant in a disparate treatment case bears the burden
of proving by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of
legitimate nondiscriminatory reasons for the employment action.
In addition, the court of appeals ruled that the defendant must
prove by objective evidence that those hired or promoted were bet-
ter qualified than the plaintiff.93
Reversing the court of appeals, the Supreme Court relied on
McDonnell Douglas. According to the Court, that case estab-
lished the articulation standard or burden of production as the
proper rebuttal standard. The court of appeals exceeded the de-
mands of the burden of production by requiring introduction of
evidence which would persuade the trier of fact that the subject
employment practice was lawful.94
The Court established that the plaintiff retains the ultimate
burden of persuasion at all times. Thus, the burden which shifts to
the defendant is one of production: "to meet the plaintiff's prima
facie case by presenting a legitimate reason for the action and to
frame the factual issue with sufficient clarity so that the plaintiff
will have a full and fair opportunity to demonstrate pretext."95
While the burden of proof issue was now clearly resolved by a
unanimous Court for disparate treatment cases, the same could
not be said for disparate impact cases. It was this lack of resolu-
tion on the latter theory of liability which set the stage for Watson
and Wards Cove.
V. DISPARATE IMPACT RESTATED~-WATSON AND WARDS COVE
The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Watson v. Fort Worth
Bank and Trust9 ostensibly to resolve the conflict in the circuits
as to whether disparate impact analysis is applicable to cases in
which subjective criteria were used to make employment deci-
91. Id. at 259.
92. Id. at 252.
93. Id.
94. Id. at 257.
95. Id. at 255-56.
96. 487 U.S. 977, 108 S. Ct. 2777 (1988).
[Vol. 26
14
California Western Law Review, Vol. 26 [1989], No. 2, Art. 9
https://scholarlycommons.law.cwsl.edu/cwlr/vol26/iss2/9
DISPARATE IMPACT
sions.97 Having decided that question in the affirmative, Justice
O'Connor went on to "clarify" the evidentiary burdens in dispa-
rate impact cases. This caused the issue to be reopened and hotly
debated.
Plaintiff Clara Watson was a black woman who was rejected on
four occasions in favor of white candidates for promotions to su-
pervisory positions in the defendant's bank.98 Instead of utilizing
formal selection criteria for promotions, the bank relied solely
upon the subjective judgment of white supervisors who were ac-
quainted with the candidates and the nature of the jobs. 91
The district court applied a disparate treatment analysis to
Watson's case and found that, although she successfully presented
a prima facie case,100 the bank rebutted it by presenting legiti-
mate and nondiscriminatory reasons for each of the promotion de-
cisions. 1' 1 The district court accepted the rebuttal argument and
dismissed the action.
The court of appeals panel affirmed in part, holding that chal-
lenges to a discretionary promotional system were properly ana-
lyzed under the disparate treatment rather than disparate impact
model.' 02 Since other circuits had held that disparate impact was
the appropriate theory for subjective hiring and promotion
claims, 0 3 certiorari was granted to resolve the conflict.0 4
The Supreme Court held that subjective employment practices
could be analyzed under the disparate impact model.0 5 The Court
reasoned that the holding of Griggs could be largely nullified if an
employer could escape liability simply by inserting subjective cri-
teria into its promotional decision-making process.' 08 The rejected
employee could then bring only a disparate treatment claim, and
97. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
98. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2782.
99. Id.
100. Watson established a prima facie case of disparate treatment by showing: (1)
she belonged to a racial minority; (2) she applied and was qualified for promotion; (3)
despite her qualifications, she was rejected; and (4) after her rejection the positions re-
mained open and defendant bank continued reviewing applications. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct.
at 2783.
101. Id.
102. 789 F.2d 791, 797 (5th Cir. 1986).
103. See, e.g. Griffin v. Carlin, 755 F.2d 1477 (9th Cir. 1985); Segar v. Smith, 738
F.2d 1249 (D.C. Cir. 1984).
104. 483 U.S. 1004, 107 S. Ct. 3227 (1987).
105. - U.S. -, 108 S. Ct. at 2787. This portion of the decision was unani-
mously accepted by the Court 8-0, with Justice Kennedy taking no part in the decision.
Justice O'Connor delivered the opinion, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices
White and Scalia. Justice Blackmun, with whom Justices Brennan and Marshall joined,
concurred in part and concurred in the judgment. Justice Stevens wrote separately, concur-
ring in the judgment.
106. Id. at __ , 108 S. Ct. at 2786.
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would thereby be forced to bear the heavier burden of proving
intentional discriminatory conduct.
The plurality10 7 went beyond the holding and turned to a reex-
amination of the order and allocation of proof in a disparate im-
pact case. Attempting to deter employers from feeling compelled
to set quotas, the Court stated that the plaintiff's initial burden in
a disparate impact case goes beyond simply showing statistical
disparities in the work force and is met only by the plaintiff iden-
tifying the specific employment practice or practices which cre-
ated the disparity. 0 8 Not only must the specific practice be identi-
fied, but the plaintiff must offer statistical evidence that this
practice caused the exclusion of applicants because of membership
in a protected group. 109
The Court then dealt with the burden which shifts to the em-
ployer. It ruled that the burden of showing job relatedness should
be read as a burden of production, not persuasion." 0 When the
employer has met this burden, the plaintiff must then show that
other tests or selection devices would serve the employer's interest
without the concomitant negative racial effect.""
In his concurring opinion, Justice Blackmun, citing Griggs, Al-
bemarle, and Dothard, argued that, contrary to the plurality's as-
sertion, it is the burden of proof, not production, which shifts to
the employer once the plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of
disparate impact." 2 Blackmun noted the similarity between the
plurality's handling of disparate impact and disparate treatment
and accused them of "turn[ing] a blind eye to the crucial distinc-
tions between the two forms of claims.""'
While only dicta, the significance of the plurality's discussion of
the evidentiary burdens under disparate impact analysis should
not be minimized. Watson set the stage for the Court's final ero-
sion of disparate impact one year later in Wards Cove. In Wards
Cove, we see the Court split into virtually identical camps as in
Watson, with the addition of Justice Kennedy giving the Watson
plurality a majority. 1 4
107. As noted supra, the plurality opinion was written by Justice O'Connor andjoined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices White and Scalia. Since the discussion of
evidentiary burdens received only four votes, it has no binding legal precedent.
108. Id. at -, 108 S. Ct. at 2788.
109. Id. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2789.
110. Id. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
I11. Id.
112. Id. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2792.
113. Id. at , 108 S. Ct. at 2793.
114. In Wards Cove, Justice White delivered the opinion of the Court with Chief
Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia and Kennedy joining. Justice Stevens filed
the dissenting opinion with Justices Brennan, Marshall and Blackmun joining. Justice
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Wards Cove was a class action suit brought by cannery workers
working in remote areas of Alaska. In 1974, a group of nonwhites,
predominantly Filipinos and Alaska Natives, alleged that hiring
and promotion practices gave rise to both disparate impact and
disparate treatment liability under Title VII. 115 The district court
rejected the disparate treatment claims and the disparate impact
challenges involving subjective employment criteria on the ground
that these could not be dealt with under disparate impact. The
objective employment practices were rejected for failure of
proof."16
The court of appeals held, as did the Supreme Court in Watson,
that disparate impact analysis could be applied to subjective hir-
ing practices" The court then stated that once disparate impact
had been shown, the burden shifted to the employer to prove busi-
ness necessity."" Certiorari was granted to resolve the questions
regarding the burdens of proof raised by Watson but answered by
only a plurality." 9
The Court first dealt with the statistics used to state a valid
prima facie case of disparate impact. The proper comparison was
held to be between the racial composition of the at-issue jobs and
the composition of the qualified work force, not a comparison of
the racial composition of the cannery versus skilled workers. This
was because the cannery workers did not form the pool of quali-
fied applicants for the noncannery jobs. 20 Consequently, the
Court reversed the court of appeals' disparate impact claim and
remanded for a determination of other bases (other than racial
disparity) for a valid claim. 2'
Without a finding of statistical disparity to support a claim of
disparate impact, the Court could have stopped there. Since on
remand, a case for disparate impact may be made on other
grounds, however, the Court addressed the other issues raised in
Watson.
First, the Court affirmed the finding in Watson that the plain-
tiff's burden extends beyond a showing of statistical disparity to
that of identifying a specific challenged practice. Analogizing to
the finding in Teal of the impermissibility of defending a claim of
Blackmun also filed a dissenting opinion, joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall.
115. - U.S. at - , 109 S. Ct. 2115 at 2120. Among the alleged illegal prac-
tices were nepotism, a rehire preference, lack of objective hiring criteria, separate hiring
channels, and a practice of hiring from within.
116. Id. at 2120.
117. 810 F.2d 1477, 1482 (9th Cir. 1987).
118. Id. at 1486.
119. 487 U.S. - (1988).
120. 109 S. Ct. 2115 at 2121.
121. Id. at 2123-24.
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disparate impact by demonstrating that the employer's work force
is racially balanced, the Court held that the plaintiff may not ar-
gue that at the bottom-line there is racial imbalance.'22
If the plaintiffs can successfully establish a prima facie case of
disparate impact for a particular practice, the Court stated that
"the case will shift to any business justification petitioners offer
for their use of these practices."' 23 This element is two-pronged:
(1) a consideration of the "justifications an employer offers for his
use of the practice" and (2) the "availability of alternate practices
to achieve the same business ends, with less racial impact.' 24
The court then added that the burden of persuasion must re-
main with the plaintiff at all times. 25 This comports with the
usual methods for allocating burdens of persuasion and production
in federal courts, but, more specifically, it conforms to the rule in
disparate treatment cases.1 26 The Court was willing to acknowl-
edge that, while some of its earlier decisions can be read as sug-
gesting otherwise, "to the extent that those cases speak of an em-
ployer's 'burden of proof' with respect to a legitimate business
justification defense, [citation] they should have been understood
to mean an employer's production-but not persuasion-
burden."127
Justice Stevens pointed out that federal courts have repeatedly
recognized that while the employer's burden in a disparate treat-
ment case is simply one of coming forward (burden of produc-
tion), the burden in a disparate impact case is proof of an affirma-
tive business necessity (burden of persuasion).2 8 Justice Stevens
further noted that
I have always believed that the Griggs opinion correctly re-
flected the intent of the Congress that enacted Title VII. Even if
I were not so persuaded, I could not join a rejection of a consis-
tent interpretation of a federal statute. Congress frequently
revisits this statutory scheme and can readily correct our mis-
takes if we misread its meaning.'29
In summary, the employer's evidentiary burden in demonstrat-
ing business necessity was ambiguous in Griggs and was subjected
122. Id. at 2124.
123. Id. at 2125.
124. Id.
125. Id. at 2126, citing Watson, 487 U.S. at - , 108 S. Ct. at 2790.
126. Id. at 2126.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 2130.
129. Id. at 2132. In fact this statutory scheme was revisited in 1972 when Congress
added the provision that federal employees were to be protected by Title VII. The 1972
amendment ratified Griggs and the disparate impact theory of discrimination. Thompson,
The Disparate Impact Theory: Congressional Intent in 1972-A Response to Gold, 8 IN-
Dus. REL. L.J. 105, 116 (1986).
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to numerous interpretations. In the 1970s and early 1980s when
Chief Justice Burger, who authored the opinion in Griggs, was
still on the Court, the subsequent cases mirrored his intent that
the employer's burden be weighty. On the other hand, in Watson
and Wards Cove the Rehnquist Court took great liberties to con-
strict the accepted interpretation of Griggs-to the point where it
is difficult to see what more it would take to state that Griggs has
been overturned.
VI. THE SEVENTH CIRCUIT INTERPRETS WARDS COVE
Less than two months after Wards Cove was handed down,
Judge Posner, writing for the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals,
simultaneously remanded two cases for hearing in light of Wards
Cove. Review of these cases demonstrates how disparate impact's
new evidentiary standards are being applied.
In Allen v. Seidman,130 Judge Posner stated that, prior to
Wards Cove, the burden of persuasion to show business necessity
shifted to the employer. Posner interpreted Wards Cove as re-
turning the burden of persuasion to the plaintiff and leaving the
employer with the burden of production.131 Posner also found the
business necessity defense to have been diluted in the manner an-
ticipated by Watson, and believed that perhaps this defense should
be renamed the "issue of legitimate employer purpose."1 32
The plaintiffs in Allen were representatives of a class of black
bank examiners employed by the Federal Deposit Insurance Cor-
poration who failed the Program Evaluation Test and were denied
promotion to the rank of commissioned bank examiners. The dis-
trict court held that a disparate impact had been demonstrated.
Since the test had not been shown to be a business necessity, judg-
ment was entered for the class. 33
The court of appeals agreed that the statistics made out a prima
facie case of disparate impact,' 4 but held the lower court had
erred in holding for the plaintiffs. The bank's failure to show that
the test was a reliable selection device was an insufficient basis for
the claim. "Showing" is the language of persuasion, and it was
wrong to place the burden of persuasion on the employer.' 35 Cur-
rently, the only issue on remand is whether the employer had a
130. 881 F.2d 375 (7th Cir. 1989).
131. Id.
132. Id. at 381.
133. Id. at 378.
134. Only 39% of black candidates who took the Program Evaluation test passed,
while 84% of the white candidates passed. Id.
135. Id. at 381.
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legitimate purpose in using the challenged test."6 It will be in-
cumbent on the employees to prove the inherent unreliability of
the test.
Evans v. Evanston,1 37 decided the same day as Allen, was a
class action suit involving 39 women applicants who failed the
physical agility test given by the Evanston fire department. The
district judge found the test to have a disparate impact on women
and that the method of scoring the test was uncorrelated to a le-
gitimate interest of the employer.1 s8 The city was obliged to pro-
duce evidence that the method of determining who passed the test
was related to the city's need for a physically capable firefighting
force. Judge Posner found that, in light of Wards Cove, all the
city needed to do was satisfy the burden of production (since it is
up to the plaintiffs to prove that the test's scoring method did not
serve the legitimate ends of the employer and unreasonably ex-
cluded women).139
On remand, using Wards Cove as a guideline, the city of Evans-
ton will meet its burden by articulating the reasons for requiring
the tests, e.g. physical agility is an important attribute for
firefighters. The onus will be on the plaintiffs to state which of the
three tests involved (agility, intelligence or stability) is causing the
alleged disparate impact. Thus, the plaintiffs must prove there is
no relationship between these tests and the city's legitimate
interests.
It can be seen from these two concrete examples that the em-
ployers in both Allen and Evans should have no problem meeting
their burden of articulating a justification for the tests or hiring
criteria. This is true even though statistically the plaintiffs estab-
lished a prima facie case of disparate impact. In anticipation of
just such a judicial result, steps were taken in another arena to
stem the backslide into pre-1964 employment tactics.
VII. THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1990
On June 23, 1989, Senator Howard Metzenbaum of Ohio intro-
duced Senate Bill 1261 in Congress which would have added a
new subsection to Title VII entitled "Proof of Unlawful Employ-
ment Practices in Disparate Impact Cases." Senator Metzen- -
baum's bill was subsequently incorportated into Senator Ken-
nedy's proposed Civil Rights Act of 1990.140 The intent of Senator
136. Id. Note the similarity to the language of disparate treatment.
137. 881 F.2d 382 (7th Cir. 1989).
138. Id. at 383.
139. Id. at 385.
140. See supra note 10.
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Metzenbaum's proposal is twofold: (1) to make clear that when a
plaintiff has made out a prima facie case of disparate impact, the
burden shifts to the employer to prove the affirmative defense of
business necessity; and (2) to allow a plaintiff to challenge a group
of employment practices without having to demonstrate which
specific practices within the group resulted in the disparate im-
pact. 41 The effect of this bill's passage would be the overturning
of Wards Cove.
Unfortunately, Senator Metzenbaum made two strategic errors
when drafting and presenting his Act to Congress which were not
corrected when it was merged with the Civil Rights Act of 1990.
The Act defines business necessity as "essential to effective job
performance.' 1 42 In Griggs, we learned that Congress placed on
the employer the burden of showing a manifest relationship to the
employment practice in question. The word "essential" was not
used in Griggs or in any of its progeny except Dothard. There, it
was reserved for a discussion of bona fide occupational require-
ments (bfoq), which comprise a very narrow exception to Title
VII. Section 703(e) requires that a bfoq be "reasonably necessary
to the normal operation of that particular business or enter-
prise."' 14 While those words may facially express Senator Met-
zenbaum's intent, the consistent interpretation of the Equal Em-
ployment Opportunity Commission has been that the bfoq
exception was meant to be an extremely narrow exception to the
general prohibition of discrimination.14 4 By defining business ne-
cessity with the word "essential," the Act exceeds the require-
ments as set forth in Griggs and crosses the line into the narrow
language of bfoq.
Senator Metzenbaum's second error was in his elaboration on
the definition of business necessity. He stated that the business
necessity defense is not established "if other comparably effective
employment practices are available that would not have an unde-
sirable effect on minorities or women.' 1 45 Section 703(j)141 of Ti-
tle VII states that no employer will be required to give preferen-
tial treatment to any member of a protected group. Title VII was
not intended to "diminish traditional prerogatives, ' '1 47 nor does it
require the employer "to restructure his employment practices to
141. Daily Labor Report No. 122, June 27, 1989.
142. S. 2104, p. 3.
143. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e).
144. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.1.
145. Congressional Records - Senate, June 23, 1989.
146. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(j).
147. Steelworkers v. Weber, 443 U.S. 193, 207 (1979).
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maximize the number of minorities and women hired.' 48
Whether intentionally or inadvertently, it appears that Senator
Metzenbaum is attempting to do more than reverse Wards Cove;
he is proposing an expansion of Title VII liability beyond its
bounds even prior to the decision in Watson. It is to be hoped that
Senator Metzenbaum will be able to garner enough support for
the intent of his contribution to the Civil Rights Act of 1990 to
prompt revision of the proposal rather than defeat. Watson and
Wards Cove provide a good indication of the direction in which
the Rehnquist Court is heading in the area of civil rights. The
Court's liberal camp is shrinking and the potential is great that
two more conservative appointments will be made when Justices
Brennan and Marshall (both of whom are in their 80's), decide to
retire. Therefore, it is unlikely that the tide will be turned absent
the interjection of a new congressional mandate.
CONCLUSION
Unless Wards Cove is preempted by the Civil Rights Act of
1990, the clock will be turned back 26 years on civil rights protec-
tion for women and minorities. The burden imposed by Watson
and confirmed by Wards Cove, albeit by a narrow majority, cre-
ates an almost insurmountable task for plaintiffs. Today, a mem-
ber of a protected class who demonstrates a disparate impact must
also isolate the particular practice responsible for this statistical
outcome and further prove that the employer has no business jus-
tification for the practice. Even with liberal discovery techniques,
it is naive to think that employers will document employment
practices potentially damaging to their case. This Note has
demonstrated that, while certainly cause for alarm, Watson and
Wards Cove had their roots in earlier decisions. " 9 If Griggs had
been more clearly written, it would not have been subjected to the
multitude of interpretations which caused it to be eroded over the
past eighteen years. "Business necessity" is a chameleon, able to
command either a burden of production or burden of persuasion,
depending on its context. A straightforward articulation of the ev-
identiary burdens in Griggs would have forced the Rehnquist
148. Furnco, at 477-78.
149. See appendix.
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Court to admit they were overruling this landmark decision,
rather than to contend in Wards Cove that they had merely been
"misunderstood" in the past.150
Carrie McCrea*
150. 109 S. Ct. 2115 at 2126. "It is one thing for the Court to act on its belief that it
is correcting its previous errors. It is quite another thing for the Court to fail to state in a
straightforward fashion that it is overturning prior decisional law." Schwartz, New York
Law Journal, Sept. 19, 1989, p. 3., col. 3.
* The author wishes to acknowledge the contribution of Stewart Galbraith and thank
Professor Paul Gudel for his thoughtful critique of countless drafts.
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Appendix
Griggs v. Duke Power Co.
(1971)
McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green (1973)
Albemarle Paper Co. v.
Moody (1975)
Dothard v. Rawlinson (1977)
Furnco Const. Corp. v.
Waters (1978)
Disparate Impact Disparate Treatment
Plaintiff must establish fa-
cially neutral test or standard
selects applicants in discrimi-
natory pattern.
Defendant must prove test or
standard was job related.
Plaintiff must establish prima
facie case of discrimination.
Defendant must articulate le-
gitimate, non-discriminatory
reason for decision.
Plaintiff must establish that
this reason was a pretext to
mask an illegal motive.
Plaintiff must establish prima
facie case of discrimination
by showing tests select appli-
cants in racially different
pattern.
Defendant must prove tests
are job related.
Plaintiff must show other
tests would serve employer's
legitimate interest without
undesirable racial effect.
Plaintiff establishes prima fa-
cie case. Defendant must ar-
ticulate job relatedness.
Plurality proposed that em-
ployer's rebuttal burden be
changed from one of persua-
sion to production.
Plaintiff establishes prima fa-
cie case.
Defendant either has burden
of proving or articulating the
basis for the employer
decision.
Which burden the defendant
must bear is unclear.
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New York City Transit
Auth. v. Beazer (1979)
Texas Dept. of Comm.
Affairs v. Burdine (1981)
Connecticut v. Teal (1982)
Watson v. Fort Worth Bank
& Trust (1988)
Wards Cove Packing Co. v.
Atonio (1984)
Plaintiff establishes prima fa-
cie case.
Defendant has burden of
showing job relatedness.
Fact that defendant harbored
no racial animus foreclosed
rebuttal argument of pretext.
(Significant because motiva-
tion of employer reserved up
to this point for disparate
treatment analysis.)
Plaintiff establishes prima fa-
cie case.
Defendant must present legit-
imate reason for the action.
Plaintiff retains ultimate bur-
den of persuasion.
Defendant's burden is merely
one of production.
Significant because even when
"bottom line" percentages not
indicative of Title VII viola-
tion, employer must still
demonstrate job relatedness
of the criteria.
Plaintiff must show not only
statistical disparity in work
force, but must also show
specific employment prac-
tice(s) causing the disparity.
Defendant bears burden of
production to establish job re-
latedness.
Plaintiff must show other
tests would serve employer's
purpose without negative ra-
cial effect.
Plaintiff must establish prima
facie case by comparing ra-
cial composition of at-issue
jobs with qualified work
force, not by comparing ra-
cial composition of skilled vs.
unskilled workers.
Affirmed Watson that plain-
tiff must identify specific
challenged practice(s).
Defendant may articulate any
business justification for use
of practice(s).
Burden of persuasion remains
with the plaintiff at all times
to conform with disparate
treatment.
1990]
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CALIFORNIA WESTERN LAW REVIEW
Allen v. Seidman (7th Cir.
1989)
Evans v. Evanston (7th Cir.
1989)
Judge Posner interpreted
Wards Cove to return burden
of persuasion to plaintiff and
leave employer with burden of
production.
Business necessity defense
should be renamed "issue of
legitimate employer purpose."
Burden on the plaintiff to
prove defendant's criteria did
not serve legitimate ends of
employer.
Defendants meet burden by
articulating reasons for crite-
ria.
Onus on plaintiff to show
which criteria creating the
disparate impact.
[Vol. 26
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